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WILL CANADA BE AN OPEN DEMOCRACY AFTER MAY 2?°
Craig Scott∗ 
The Context 
On Monday, May 2, Canadians will vote in a federal election.   It remains unclear whether the results 
will be significantly affected by deep concerns amongst many Canadians of authoritarian, deceitful 
and multifariously unethical behavior by the governing Conservative Party since becoming a 
minority government in 2006 (re-elected in 2008).  The list of concerns is far too long to begin to 
summarize in this article, and I rely for present purposes on the yeoman’s service of journalist 
Lawrence Martin in his 2010 book Harperland: The Politics of Control.  Martin does a commendable job 
showing exactly why and how both Canada’s democracy and core public values have been 
threatened by the mentality, actions and game plan of Stephen Harper and his party. By extension, 
Martin’s work makes clear what to expect (and indeed fear) should this individual ever become 
Prime Minister of a majority government. 
A year ago, in response to Harper’s prorogation  of Parliament, the Nathanson Centre on 
Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security held an all-day forum on oversight and 
accountability relating to Canada’s policy of in-theatre transfers of Afghan detainees to the 
notoriously torture-prone National Directorate of Security in Kandahar, Member of Parliament.  At 
that forum, Member of Parliament Bob Rae (Foreign Affairs Critic for the Liberal Party of Canada) 
remarked that the combination of a culture of governmental secrecy and the ineffectual mechanisms 
for Parliamentary scrutiny of executive conduct in Canada is basically unparalleled in leading 
democracies.  I believe he was and remains correct.   
Some evidence for this belief was published in the Government Information Quarterly at the end of 
2010 in a study by two scholars, Robert Hazell and Ben Worthy of the Constitution Unit of 
University College London.  With respect to freedom of information laws and related practice, 
Hazell and Worthy ranked Canada last of five Westminster democracies (being Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia, the UK, and Ireland).  My (possibly naïve) hope is that, if ever the current 
Conservative Party leaves office in Ottawa, the current opposition parties will make good on years 
of complaining about the situation and craft a legislative framework that is at least as good as the 
more effective aspects of the systems and practices in these other four countries. Even more 
optimistically, Canadians’ experience of aggressive anti-transparency politics in the Harper era will 
provide a home-grown basis for Canada to both build on and leapfrog the quite radical reforms in 
New Zealand, some enlightened practice in Australia around parliamentary intelligence scrutiny, and 
a now-more-open Westminster, in order to set a new standard for arriving at the right 
transparency/secrecy constellation.  
° This article has been accepted for publication by OpenDemocracy.net and is planned to appear on 
Wednesday, April 27, 2011 at http://www.opendemocracy.net.  
∗ Director, Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security, and Professor of Law at 




My purpose in this article is to raise awareness of the threat to open democracy in Canada posed by 
the nearly pathological extent to which secrecy and manipulation of access to the truth has taken 
over Ottawa and Parliamentary affairs in Canada.  I do this by narrating three interconnected 
examples of how bad things have gotten in Canada.  I hasten to note that these are but three 
examples from a much longer list.  That said, the three have not been chosen at random. What 
unifies them is both the context of a broken Parliamentary system faced with a resolutely all-
controlling Prime Minister and a specific substantive concern.  That concern is the question of why 
Canada’s government has deliberately maintained a policy of transferring detainees in Afghanistan to 
Afghan intelligence services (notably, the National Directorate of Security or NDS) in full 
knowledge of the torture practices of those agencies and thus of the risks faced by each transferred 
detainee.  My working hypothesis has been, and remains, that a central explanatory variable could 
well turn out to be that Canada’s government has prioritized intelligence-gathering through coercive 
interrogation by NDS in order that such intelligence will later make its way to Canadian authorities 
to assist Canada in its war effort in Afghanistan.  
The present contribution can further be read as a complement to a recently published dialogue with 
Dan Fata of The Cohen Group on “Secrecy and Good Governance” in which one of my points is 
that we generally need leaking (whether Wikileaking or other) as a mechanism for accountability in a 
world in which secrecy culture and instrumental politics can easily hide and cover up serious moral 
and legal wrongdoing.  What follows further demonstrates that the need for leaking in Canada is 
especially acute, as long as Canada’s culture and institutionalization of accountability remains so 
primitive and especially if a politician with the caudillo-esque (that is to say, political strongman) 
orientation of Stephen Harper again forms a government after May 2.   
Whistle blowing on the whistle blowing system 
For timely whistle blowing to occur, public servants have to know that whistle blowing will 
consistently receive effective protection.  This will result in people stepping forward.  More 
systemically, a pattern of effective protection will gradually deter some wrongful conduct from 
occurring in the first place.  
However, in Canada, there is good reason to doubt that most public servants feel safe stepping 
forward.  We recently had the spectacle this past December – and here, I turn to my first of three 
examples – of one government watchdog (namely, Canada’s Auditor General, who has represented 
Canada’s gold standard of independent scrutiny of government for a decade) in effect blowing the 
whistle on another government watchdog.  But it was not just any watchdog on whom Auditor 
General Sheila Fraser blew the whistle but the watchdog who was the Harper-appointed protector 
of whistle blowers, Public Sector Integrity Commissioner (PSIC) Christiane Ouimet.  Auditor 
General Fraser reported that the “PSIC received a total of 114 disclosures of wrongdoing and 42 
complaints of reprisal in the first two years of its operation. During this period, out of the 156 files, 
three formal investigations were conducted. No disclosures of wrongdoing were determined to be 
founded and no reprisal complaints were referred to the Tribunal.” The Auditor General goes on to 
link these figures to the concerns of interviewed officials in Ouimet’s own office, who observed that 
the PSIC seemed to act as if her mission were to protect government not whistleblowers.  
When this report came out, a realization dawned. In the context of several years of efforts by a 
variety of citizens, including myself, to pry information out of the government of Canada with 




Canada hands over detainees, I had often found myself asking, “Why are there not more leaks from 
inside government on this?”  The penny dropped when the Auditor General’s report on PSIC 
Ouimet came out:  if I were a public servant contemplating whistle blowing and if I had my ear to 
the ground on what protection (i.e. lack of protection) I could expect, I would know that I have 
reason to fear reprisals. The official exposé of the PSIC by the Auditor General drove home to me 
just how deep the secrecy rot in Canada is.  
A single sentence on torture hidden from public knowledge 
As for the second example, I cannot, in the limited space we have, convey the full Kafkaesque 
dimensions of what follows and how it connects up with other uses of the courts by the Harper 
government to stall and obfuscate transparency efforts, but hopefully you will get a flavor.   
Consider the following sentence in a 2006 internal report (within Canada’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade / DFAIT) on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: “Extra-
judicial executions, disappearances, torture, and detention without trial are all too common [in 
Afghanistan].”  This sentence was found by the Director of Access to Information of DFAIT and, 
upon review, by Canada’s Information Commissioner to be a sentence that could be excluded from 
a release of information by the federal government to University of Ottawa Professor of Law Amir 
Attaran under a freedom of information request. These access-to-information officials apparently 
‘reasoned’ that any relevance of the passage to the public interest (including any implications that 
knowledge of torture has for legal responsibility of government and government officials) was 
outweighed by the difficulty that the sentence would supposedly cause for Canada in its foreign 
relations with Afghanistan.   
With reasoning like that, there is clearly a rule-of-law deficit at the level of interpretive practice.  As 
such, there is little chance that any public servant would believe that a leak of similar information 
would fall within whistle blowing protection, and it is thus little wonder that there have been very 
few other leaks published in the past two years in Canadian newspapers in relation to the Canadian 
transfer-to-the-risk-of-torture practice.  
Note that, when I say “other” leaks, I am referring to the fact that this particular sentence had 
actually already been leaked to the public after Professor Attaran had initiated litigation before the 
Federal Court of Canada to seek to have the information officials’ rulings overturned. In the result, 
the Federal Court (Kelen J.), in Amir Attaran v. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Canada), did order the 
above-quoted passage to be released but only because the offending passage had already been quoted 
in the reasons of another Federal Court judge in another matter and because the Globe and Mail 
newspaper had already published the passage.  In the course of its reasoning, the Federal Court 
largely endorsed the root reasoning of the Access to Information officer at DFAIT and the 
Information Commissioner, partly on the merits and partly on the basis of adopting a deferential 
standard of judicial review.   
Had the ‘offending’ passage not independently found its way into the public domain after Professor 
Attaran had started his litigation, the tenor of the judge’s reasoning was that the sentence “Extra-
judicial executions, disappearances, torture, and detention without trial are all too common [in 
Afghanistan].” would to this day be hidden from public knowledge in Canada and Afghanistan.  As 





were not ordered released, and we remain ignorant of whether any of them provide evidence of 
Canadian government knowledge that torture is “all too common” not simply in Afghanistan in 
general but more specifically at the hands of the National Directorate of Security to which Canada 
transfers captured Afghan detainees.  
 
Ad hoc Parliamentary process that is full of holes 
 
The third and final example should have become a live issue in the current election campaign as 
(well before the federal election was called) one opposition leader, the Bloc Québécois’ Gilles 
Duceppe, had issued an ultimatum that set April 15 as a deadline for a special documents-review 
process to report on the Canadian detainee-transfer practice. That ultimatum-deadline has come and 
gone, and it seems likely that Canadians will vote on May 2 without any further information; arbiters 
involved in the process announced on April 14 that they refuse to release any information during an 
election. For present purposes, it is this special process that warrants scrutiny for what it reveals 
about the primitive state of Parliamentary scrutiny of executive conduct in Canada.  
 
In late 2009, Parliament heard revelations about torture concerns within Canada’s detainee-transfer 
system when a career diplomat, Richard Colvin, testified before the House of Commons Special 
Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. Demands were then made by the Special 
Committee (by virtue of the fact that opposition MPs constitute a majority on the committee) for 
the government to provide unredacted documents related to the affair. The government then 
engaged in a variety of resistance tactics including providing documents with virtually multi-page 
redactions.  
 
As Canada does not have a legislative framework let alone one as robust or sophisticated as, for 
example, the US Congress’ powers of executive oversight, the House of Commons stepped in and 
adopted a resolution ordering the government to give up unredacted documents to Parliament 
within a range of listed subject categories.  This Parliamentary order was only possible because the 
opposition parties could exercise their power due to having a numerical majority of MPs in a 
minority Parliament.  In a majority-government Parliament, this recourse to the ‘will of Parliament’ 
would almost certainly not enter into play. 
 
A crisis ensued. The Prime Minister prorogued Parliament in order to avoid the immediate effects of 
the Parliamentary order.  Some months later in spring 2010, after Parliament had been reconvened, 
the Speaker of the House of Commons, Peter Milliken, ruled that Parliament indeed had plenary 
authority to order the government to provide Parliament with unredacted documents.  At the same 
time, the Speaker welcomed and encouraged an intra-Parliament negotiated process that would 
strike the right balance between the government’s ongoing secrecy imperatives and the House’s 
transparency agenda.  
 
The bottom-line result was that eventually two of the three opposition parties (the Official 
Opposition Liberal Party and the Bloc Québécois) reached an agreement with the governing 
Conservative Party on an ad hoc process to receive and review unredacted documents.  The New 
Democratic Party declined to participate. Within this process, three Members of Parliament, one 
from each of these three parties (each with an alternate MP), receive all the documents released in 
accordance with the agreement. Then, those three MPs decide whether they believe the documents 
are both “relevant to matters of importance to Members of Parliament” and “necessary for the 





rationale is satisfied, then the documents go to a Panel of (three) Arbiters, all being former judges 
(two having served on the Supreme Court of Canada).  That Panel of former judges then decides 
whether a document can be fully released to Parliament (and thus presumably to the public) or 
whether it must either remain entirely secret or redacted in some way on grounds of “national 
defence, national security, and international relations.”  The agreement provides that the “decisions 
of the ad hoc committee related to relevance shall be final and unreviewable” and “decisions of the 
Panel of Arbiters with respect to disclosure shall be final and unreviewable.”   
 
This process has been in operation since early summer 2010, and – over nine months down the road 
– Canadians have still not heard a peep from this process.  
 
To some this ad hoc committee process may appear reasonable in the circumstances of cobbling 
something together given the non-existent and primitive Parliamentary scrutiny system in Canada. 
But what needs to be known is that there are a host of problems with this process, apart from the 
significant delay already experienced.  For example, the ad hoc committee not only consists of a 
mere three MPs but also it has no independent staff support; its support comes in the form of  
government staff who can be called upon to help the ad hoc committee understand a document’s 
context and to explain the reasons for secrecy from those officials’ perspective.  Consider also the 
lack of a halfway house between the tiny ad hoc committee seeing the documents and all of 
Parliament seeing them.  There is also the troubling failure of the agreement to make the same 
statement the decision on “necessity” being final and unreviewable as is found in the three-party 
agreement with respect to decisions on both “relevance” and “disclosure”; this failure gives rise to 
the concern that the government may treat this omission as providing a basis for seeking judicial 
review of combined relevance, necessity, and disclosure decisions on the basis of an argued lack of 
necessity.  
 
But probably the greatest problem stems from the three-party agreement’s treatment of two 
categories of document.  Clause 7 of the agreement provides: “The Panel of Arbiters can determine, 
at the request of the government, that certain information should not be disclosed due to the 
solicitor-client privilege. The Panel of Arbiters, after consultation with the Clerk of the Privy 
Council, can also determine, at the request of the government, that information constituting Cabinet 
confidences should not be disclosed. In both such cases, the Panel of Arbiters shall determine how 
information contained in the documents may be made available to Members of Parliament and the 
public without compromising the solicitor-client privilege or the principle of Cabinet confidentiality, 
by such techniques as the Panel may find appropriate, bearing in mind the basic objective of 
maximizing disclosure and transparency. Should the Panel of Arbiters decide that certain 
information should not be disclosed, the Panel will provide the rationale for its decisions to the ad 
hoc committee.” The presence of these terms in the draft agreement (terms that had not been 
mentioned in an earlier “agreement in principle” that all four parties that had been tabled in 
Parliament) caused a third opposition party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), to withdraw from 
the negotiations and not to sign the agreement. The NDP were furious that two entire categories of 
documents had in effect been added to the substantive exclusionary criteria of “national defence, 
national security, and international relations.”  
 
We can only wait to see how vigorously the government seeks (or, unbeknownst to us, has already 
been seeking) to exclude documents related to solicitor-client privilege and Cabinet confidentiality 
and whether the Panel of Arbiters comes up with techniques to release certain important 





clear is that the very nature of the concerns about governmental and individual responsibility for 
sending Afghan detainees to risk of torture are such that the legal advice received by government 
and the reasoning of Ministers on maintaining the policy are absolutely crucial.   
 
A more open democracy 
 
The ultimate lesson of these three interconnected narratives is how manifestly unprepared Canada’s 
parliamentary system is for striking the right balance between secrecy and transparency in relation to 
matters such as the Afghan detainee-transfer question.  A well-conceived institutional framework is 
needed along with a re-orientation of the mindset of accountability actors (whether civil servants, 
courts or watchdog commissioners) away from what amounts to a presumption of secrecy and 
toward a strong presumption of transparency.  
 
After the May 2 federal election, Canadians must hold all MPs’ feet to the fire and demand that 
Canada enter a new era of a much more open democracy. 
 
